Jonathan Adler writes in the WSJ:
the public does not seem to feel all that heatedly about the warming of the planet. In survey after survey, American voters say that they care about global warming, but the subject ranks quite low when compared with other concerns (e.g., the economy, health care, the war on terror). Even when Mr. Gore’s Oscar-winning film, “An Inconvenient Truth,” was at the height of its popularity, it did not increase the importance of global warming in the public mind or mobilize greater support for Mr. Gore’s favored remedies–e.g., reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by government fiat. Mr. Gore may seek to make environmental protection civilization’s “central organizing principle,” as he puts it, but there is no constituency for such a regime. Hence even the Democratic Party’s presidential candidates, in their debates, give global warming only cursory treatment, with lofty rhetoric and vague policy proposals.
There is a reason for this political freeze-up. In “Break Through,” Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger argue that Mr. Gore and the broader environmental movement–in which Mr. Gore plays an almost messianic part–remain wedded to an outmoded vision, seeing global warming as “a problem of pollution to be fixed by a politics of limits.” Such a vision may have worked in the early days of environmentalism, when the first clear-air and clean-water regulations were pushed through Congress, but today it cannot mobilize enough public support for dramatic political change.
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Messrs. Nordhaus and Shellenberger want “an explicitly pro-growth agenda,” on the theory that investment, innovation and imagination may ultimately do more to improve the environment than punitive regulation and finger-wagging rhetoric. To stabilize atmospheric carbon levels will take more–much more–than regulation; it will require “unleashing human power, creating a new economy.”
It is not that the authors are opposed to the government playing a role in this “new economy.” They would like to see federal programs offset the harm of regulation, for instance, acknowledging the trade-offs of environmentalist policies. If auto workers lose their livelihood because of a new fuel-economy rule, they may need to be compensated, perhaps by a health-care subsidy. The authors’ most detailed proposal is for a government-funded “Apollo Project” to spur the development of low-carbon energy technologies. Regulatory-centered approaches to climate change, they say, are “economically insufficient to accelerate the transition to clean energy.” An “investment centered” approach is better.
Such a shift in focus would be welcome, of course, but it is hard to see why their centralized subsidy plan would produce commercially profitable–that is, “pro-growth”–technologies better than the multiple efforts of private investors. In short: Why would an “Apollo” plan succeed where the Synthetic Fuels Corp. failed? Having accepted the platitude that “human governance is what makes markets possible,” the authors embrace the fatal conceit that markets can somehow be planned or manipulated to achieve a grand and worthy purpose.